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V. CONCLUSIONS 34I. Introduction*
China has recorded extraordinary growth rates since the beginning of its mar-
ket oriented reforms in 1978. While reforms began in the agricultural sector,
the industrial sector has been at the core of reform efforts since 1983. As early
as 1978, the share of industry in China's GDP was exceptionally high at 38.4
per cent (1987 prices), compared for instance with only 23 per cent in India. At
the same time, the Maoist industrialisation drive was widely blamed for an
overemphasis on heavy industry, an extensive growth path that took no ac-
count of relative scarcities and a resulting stagnant or even negative total fac-
tor productivity growth (World Bank, 1985; Tidrick, 1986; Demberger, 1988). In
1991, after almost a decade of industrial reforms, China's industrial sector had
grown to 48 per cent of GDP. Indeed, gross real output growth averaged 13
per cent per annum from 1978-1992. Thus, inspite of a seemingly distorted
economic structure, China has so far been able to avoid the dramatic output
decline characteristic of industrial reforms in almost all other emerging market
economies (EMEs), particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Bruno,
1992).
One feature of industrial performance that China shares with the European
EMEs is the decline in the profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
(McKinnon, 1991).JVhile the average profitability (gross profit over gross value
of output) of Chinese industry has declined overall, falling profits (and recently,
growing losses), in SOEs have particularly serious consequences forthe rest
of the economy. First, as tax revenue in socialist economies relied almost ex-
clusively on transfers from SOEs, transition economies face a dramatic erosion
in their tax base. Second, as the institutional regulations needed to provide for
the smooth exit of loss-making public enterprises from the market are missing,
an increasing share of loss-makers among SOEs increases the burden of
subsidisation for their legal owners, namely the central or provincial govern-
ments. Third, as SOEs usually fulfil a number of social obligations in addition to
their productive activities, closing loss-making SOEs may cause social disrup-
tion and endanger the entire reform process. Although the share of SOEs in
industrial employment in China has always been less than in Central and East-
ern Europe, by the early 1990s it was still around 45 per cent. Moreover, by
This paper was written as part of the project "The role of state-owned enterprises in eco-
nomic transformation: Lessons from China for Central and Eastern Europe". Financial
support form the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are due to
Peter Nunnenkamp for helpful comments and Michaela Rank for skilful research
assistance.1993 over 30 per cent of SOEs were estimated as making losses and, by the
first half of 1994 this estimate rose to 48 per cent (Perkins and Raiser, 1994).
Corresponding to falling profits in SOEs, China has begun to share many of the
problems of subsidisation of loss-makers evident in other EMEs, namely rising
budget deficits, non-performing bank loans and rising inter-enterprise debt
chains. From 1987 to 1993 the consolidated budget deficit (including policy
loans from the Peoples Bank of China) increased from 3-4 per cent of GDP to
7-9 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 1994b, p. 26). The puzzle thus arises how
China is able to record high industrial output growth (even in SOEs the gross
value of output increased by a yearly average of 8 per cent since 1978) while
an increasing proportion of its SOEs are loss-making. Is the fall in industrial
profitability an inevitable and to a certain extent welcome development as it re-
flects increasing competition on Chinese markets (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994;
Zheng, 1994)? Or does it reflect increasing allocative inefficiencies in Chinese
firms and indicates that the limits to an extensive growth path are becoming
evident in China (Chai, 1994; IMF, 1993; Woo et al., 1994)?
This paper aims to clarify the questions raised above. The focus on SOEs al-
lows to test some hypotheses concerning the behaviour of firms subject to soft
budget constraints (Kornai, 1986; 1993; Raiser, 1993). In particular, should
SOEs in China be characterised by persistent allocative inefficiencies in the
course of reforms, the decline in profitability in the state sector would be
symptomatic for delayed adjustments. In consequence, without far reaching
institutional reforms at the micro-economic level, the sustainability of macro-
economic stability might be jeopardised by the growing burden of subsidisation
of inefficient SOEs. Such a line of argument would also find support with
mounting evidence for statistical fraud by SOE managers (Rawski, 1993;
Lingle and Wickman, 1994) and conclude that China's world record growth
rates might well have to be taken with a considerable grain of salt.
1
Conversely, if SOEs had improved their allocative efficiency since 1983 and
total factor productivity growth was positive during the 1980s and 1990s,
China's gradual and experimental reform strategy in the industrial sector might
well have paid off (Jefferson and Rawski, 1992; 1994; McMillan and Naughton,
1992; Naughton, 1993). Falling profitability in SOEs might be attributed to in-
creasing competition from China's emerging non-state sector and the dispro-
By implication, this hypothesis would expect enterprises with private property rights and
harder budget constraints, such as the township and village enterprises, to grow more
rapidly and display higher allocative efficiency than SOEs. Indeed, already the dynamic
township and village enterprises (TVEs) account for a rising proportion of industrial out-
put growth (Sachs and Woo, 1994).tection of the SOE capital stock in the course of price and trade liberalisation.
Additionally, the implication of generally market oriented behaviour in the. ma-
jority of SOEs would enhance the scope for sustainable indirect macro-eco-
nomic management without the urgent need for micro-economic reforms.
The following section gives a brief overview over industrial reforms in China
since 1983 and surveys some of the literature on industrial performance. The
next two sections turn to the behaviour of SOEs on the basis of micro-
economic survey data from four coastal cities in China. Specifically, the third
section attempts to measure allocative inefficiency in SOEs as the deviation of
labour shares from production elasticities of labour. Section IV looks at other
determinants of profitability. The fifth section summarises the evidence and
derives policy conclusions.
88. Industrial Reforms and State-Owned Enterprise Performance en
China in Retrospect
Industrial reforms in China commenced in 1983, following limited experiments
with enterprise taxation and increased autonomy in output and investment
decisions during the early 1980s.
2 From 1984, the two-tier pricing system
allowed SOEs to sell a growing share of their output on the free market and to
buy additional inputs at free market prices. Investment decisions were also
decentralised and a commercial banking system introduced in 1984. After
uniform income taxation had replaced direct profit transfers to the budget in
1984, the contract responsibility system, introduced in 1986, returned to a
more discretionary form of taxation. Financial relationships between the
supervisory authorities and SOEs were now formalised in terms of agreed ex
ante input and output quotas to be bought and sold at official prices in return
for a profit delivery quota also fixed in advance. Finally, workers benefited from
the reintroduction of bonuses linked to enterprise profitability and some
flexibility was allowed in employment relations through the introduction of
temporary work contracts (see also Groves et al., 1994; Hay et al., 1994).
The pace of reform was relatively rapid up until the macro-economic crisis of
1988-89 which was followed by a period of retrenchment. Particularly, price
controls were reestablished and investment autonomy curtailed. Moreover, the
phase of macro-economic austerity lasting until 1991 revealed that loss-making
SOEs were effectively shielded from bankruptcy in the event of insolvency.
Massive financial injections and government interventions in credit allocation
prevented an industrial shake-out in the public sector during that period, while
2 For a review of industrial reforms see Hussain (1990), Bell and Kochhar (1992) and IMF
(1993).at the same time failures were numerous among the township and village
enterprises and in the growing private sector (Li, 1991). Since 1992 a :new
wave of reforms has focused on corporate governance issues in SOEs. The
Regulations on Changing the Operating Mechanism of Enterprise issued in
that year were to guide the implementation of the bankruptcy law which was
legally effective since 1988. In return, the autonomy of SOEs in issues relating
to current operations was greatly increased and first steps towards the
commercialisation of the industrial sector were taken. This reform agenda
culminated in the reform proposals of November 1993 which allow for the trade
in SOEs
1 assets and introduce shareholder liability for all firms, including loss-
makers (see also World Bank, 1994b).
Today most SOEs largely operate in a market environment with respect to the
prices they pay for material inputs and receive for their output, although price
controls are still in existence in some crucial areas such as energy and the use
of public utilities. A uniform corporate income tax rate of 33 per cent in principle
applies to all firms, after which remaining profit may be retained, but
discretionary exemptions from tax obligations are widespread. Significant
government restrictions still apply with respect to access to imports and the
use of foreign exchange earnings (Perkins and Zheng, 1994; Fukasaku and
Wall, 1993). Despite the introduction of a labour contract system as early as
1986, most SOEs are also significantly restricted in the hiring and firing of
labour and a cap may apply to the sum of worker remunerations (Hay et al.,
1994). Moreover, most SOEs still have access to subsidised loans from the
state-owned banking system and are subject to credit restrictions under the
credit plan. Finally, the implementation of bankruptcy on loss-making firms has
been extremely deficient and management accountability and the structure of
property rights is weak. In sum, the operating environment of Chinese SOEs is
characterised by opposing trends. Price and trade liberalisation and the
increase of domestic competition have served to harden the budget constraint
for SOEs, while the credit market and institutional deficiencies related to
bankruptcy enforcement continue to shelter loss-makers from pressures for
market exit.
3
3 The IMF (1993, p. 74) concludes: "The least progress can be observed in [...] the state
enterprise sector where, despite the gradual exposure to market forces, many industries
remained subject to mandatory planning and nonmarket pricing. These industries have
been protected from market forces by a soft budget constraint motivated by the political
goals of maintaining employment opportunities and social stability."We should note that the reform profiles have differed markedly between
regions in China, with the coastal provinces spearheading the reform process
in almost every area. Structural change, even in the state-owned sector, was
facilitated by the inflow of foreign direct investment and the access to
international markets. At the same time, the share of non-state activity in the
coastal provinces of Zeijang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian, and Shandong had
increased to 60-70 per cent by 1991 (IMF, 1993, p. 48) providing for a degree
of internal competition conspicuously absent in the far less developed inner
provinces. This should be borne in mind when the enterprise survey data from
four coastal cities are anaiysed in Sections III and IV.
If the degree to which SOEs continue to be sheltered from competitive
pressures remains ambiguous, the impact of industrial reforms on enterprise
performance is all the more debated. The discussion generally focuses on the
rate of total factor productivity growth as the prime indicator for industrial
performance. Estimates on TFP vary substantially over years and regions and
over authors. Chen et ai. (1988) were the first to find a significant break in the
contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) improvements to output growth in
1978. Thus, while TFP growth in their estimation using aggregate industrial
data was only 0.8 per cent per annum between 1953 and 1978, it was 5.2 per
cent between 1978 and 1985. This result has been corroborated by Lau and
Brada (1990) and Beck and Bohnet (1989) using different frontier production
function approaches on the same data.
4 Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992)
expand the framework of Chen et al. by including intermediate inputs in the
production function. Their results indicate positive TFP growth of 2.4 per cent
per annum in SOEs between 1980 and 1988, but around double that rate in
collective enterprises (COEs).
5 Perkins et al. (1993) find positive TFP growth of
3.8 per cent per annum in SOEs (1980-1989) in the special economic zone of
Xiamen and a much higher rate of 5.8 per cent for COEs. At the same time,
however, Perkins et a!. (1993) find that, based on industrial aggregates, TFP
growth was stagnant in Shanghai and Beijing, where the pace of economic
reforms has been less rapid.
The estimation of TFP growth is extremely sensitive to the use of appropriate
input and output deflators (Woo et al., 1994). For instance, Jefferson, Rawski
4 Interestingly, the latter study finds that technical inefficiency rather than allocative
inefficiency was the major cause of deviations from the best practice between 1978 and
1985.
5 Collective enterprises are owned by provinvial or district level authorities and are thus
subject to considerably harder budget constraints than SOEs (sse below).and Zheng (1992) introduced capital stock and material input deflators that are
substantially higher than the deflator for industrial output and therefore largely
account for the result of positive TFP growth. The implication of a falling value
added deflator is doubted by Woo et al. (1994) who point at the overinflation of
output data by SOE managers as an offsetting bias to the possibility that prices
of intermediate inputs may have risen more rapidly than output prices. When
materials were deflated with the output price deflator, TFP growth became
negative in their study of 300 SOEs between 1980 and 1988. Excluding
materials from the production function and deflating value added with the
output price deflator led to insignificant estimates for TFP growth. The same
conclusion is reached for 700 SOEs between 1980 and 1987 in a recent study
by Hay et al. (1994). The consequence of stagnant TFP growth in China's
industrial SOEs is, of course, that their growth has been largely extensive. As
the mobilisation of household savings for industrial investment becomes
progressively more difficult, because alternative options for savings are
increasingly available, an extensive growth strategy would soon face severe
capital shortage.
A falling value added deflator is one way to interpret the puzzle of industrial
output growth and falling profitability.
6 However, the plausibility of the
underlying relative price trends in a country experiencing gradual price
liberalisation is not easy to gauge, as cross-country comparisons are missing.
7
Hence Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng have recently pointed towards the
equalisation of profit rates across industrial branches in support of their
interpretation (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994). A contrarian view on industrial
output growth and profit decline doubts the evidence of rapid productivity
improvements in SOEs and attributes falling profits to the rising share of
worker compensations in industrial value added - a clear signal of non-
maximising behaviour in SOEs being no longer under the discipline of central
6 Note that this pattern of industrial development is unstable in the long run. Unless the
efficiency improvements in the manufacturing sector are large enough to offset the terms
of trade loss, capital would tend to move out of this sector and growth would be reduced.
Considering China's exceptionally large share of industry in GDP this may even be a
desirable development. For instance, similar relative price trends have led to a process of
deindustrialisation in Vietnam (Diehl, 1994).
7 The comparison to Poland and Hungary made by Woo et al. (1994) is inconclusive
because of very different economic structures Thus, relative price changes depend on
the degree of previous distortions which is typically unknown. It is noteworthy, however,
that both Poland and Hungary experienced a rising value added deflator in
manufacturing during the 1980s. By 1989, both countries had liberalised over half of all
producer prices (Commander and Coricelli, 1991).planning (Woo et al., 1994). The measurement of allocative efficiency in SOEs
thus becomes of central importance for clarifying whether and how SOEs have
adjusted to changing incentives since the start of industrial reforms.
SSI. Has Aliocative Efficiency Improved? SOEs Between Profit Incentives
and Deficient Sanctions
a) The Impact of Budget Softness on Allocative Efficiency
In principle, the liberalisation of prices in economies in transformation should
provide incentives for an improvement in the allocation of resources. The
waste of specific factors, such as energy, should diminish as their opportunity
costs increase.
8 Taking consideration of the institutional peculiarities of EMEs
this may not necessarily be the case, however. In particular in economies
where soft budget constraints keep loss-making enterprises afloat and where
contract enforcement is weak, the opportunity costs of any factor input at the
level of the enterprise may deviate from the price paid (Kornai, 1993; Raiser,
1993). Thus managers may collude with workers and pay out wages in excess
of labour's marginal product because the political costs of imposing wage
restraint or laying off employees may be higher than the costs of lobbying the
government for subsidies. Similarly, a low probability of loan repayment
induces enterprises to overborrow and overinvest. Finally, where suppliers
cannot legally enforce payment, material inputs may be acquired at effectively
no cost.
9 All these problems are potentially aggravated in SOEs, or in any firm
where property rights are unclarified, because managers and workers care less
about the long run viability of their firm and may exploit existing assets for the
benefit of an increase in current incomes (Schmieding, 1993).
While most of the above factors limiting the effectiveness of price liberalisation
in improving the allocation of resources still seem to be present in China to
some extent (for details see Perkins and Raiser, 1994), it is likewise evident
that the incentives for cost minimisation at the level of SOEs have been
8 The extent to which price distortions in socialist economies may have led to allocative
inefficiencies is estimated by Hare and Hughes (1992) who find that around a third of all
sectors in five European EMEs were producing negative value added at world prices at
the start of reforms. Similar calculations for China show that, in 1992, the majority of all
downstream consumer goods industries were value substractors at world prices and
would not survive in a free import regime (World Bank, 1994a).
9 Of course, a customer defaulting on outstanding payments risks not getting any supplies
in the future. However, in the short run both supplier and customer may expect a
government bail-out and thus payment defaults are passed on through the entire
industrial sector in the form of cumulative debt chains (Rostowski, 1994).increased substantially over the course of reform. Thus even if material and
capital inputs are acquired at a low opportunity cost, the existence of parallel
free markets on which these inputs may be traded and the right to retain the
profits resulting from such operations signifies that SOEs would face incentives
for cost minimisation at the margin (Hay et al., 1994; McMillan and Naughton,
1994). The fundamental question is whether these incentives were sufficient in
inducing behavioural changes in SOEs, despite the fact that lack of adjustment
would hardly be sanctioned by the threat of market exit.
Evidently, SOEs must be autonomous in their decisions if they are to react to
given profit incentives. Hence, remaining government regulations are likely to
distort the incentive structure and make an investigation of SOE behaviour in
the face of soft budget constraints difficult. In China this is most obvious in the
labour market. The virtual impossibility of mass lay-offs signifies that SOEs
have only limited room for manoeuvre, for instance in adjusting employment
levels to a change in the level or structure of demand. Indeed, even if workers
are transferred from the productive core of the firm to its affiliated welfare and
service activities, these workers usually remain on the pay roll of the enterprise
(see Hay et al., 1994). Moreover, retired workers receive their pensions out of
their enterprises' welfare funds. As a result, SOEs facing a negative demand
shock would display increasing wage shares inspite of internal adjustment
efforts.
Nonetheless, given that SOEs have some degree of autonomy, the labour
market is also the area where the conflict between soft budget constraints and
market incentives may be most easily analysed empirically. First, data on the
costs of labour inputs, such as wages and bonuses are usually available at the
firm level.
1
0 Second, the link of bonus payments to profitability is a clear
positive incentive for workers to minimise costs and reduce current claims to
the benefit of investment and future income. Third, and by contrast to second,
if a firm is making losses and its potential to make profits after some
adjustments is low, in the absence of a bankruptcy threat, there are obvious
incentives to pay wages by "eating" the firm's assets.
b) Allocative Inefficiency in the Labour Market: Previous Findings
The basic framework for the study of allocative inefficiency is the neo-classical
theory of the firm. The first order condition for profit maximisation implies that
1
0 By contrast, in segmented capital markets where access to bank lending is discretionary
to a significant extent and the enforcement of interest payments is weak, the opportunity
cost of capital inputs may be more difficult to measure.input prices should equal the marginal revenue products for the same inputs.
For the case of a Cobb Douglas production function we get the convenient
result that at the profit maximum factor shares equal output elasticities. Thus
allocative inefficiency may be directly measured as the deviation of factor
shares from estimated output elasticities. For the case of labour inputs, wage
drift can be estimated as a the positive difference between the share of labour
in value added and the output elasticity of labour:
i) Production function: Yit = A?KitLl
3Y W
Profit maximisation: -JL-SL .
oh-., P.
k, P, YitPt
Wage Drift: 5=-^ - A,, with
u. > 0, indicator of wage drift ., ;
Y = real value added
K = real stock of capital
L = ^ number of workers
1
1
A = level of technical efficiency
X = rate of neutral technical progress P
W = nominal wage
P = producer price index
t = time subscript
i = individual subscript.
If factor markets are competitive and enterprises are allocatively efficient then
the relationships in i) imply that factor returns should be equal across all firms:
EL-3L~R^L- RLL
P, P, Lu LJ, .
i, j = individual subscripts.
Accounting for unmeasurable heterogeneity of factor inputs, the relationship in
ii) is unlikely to hold. However, a movement towards allocative efficiency might
still be indicated by a falling coefficient of variation of factor returns within a
sample of firms or the convergence of factor returns between different enter-
prise subsamples.
1
1 In our empirical specification no adjustment for hours worked was possible. Labour was
assumed to be homogenous.10
The relationships stylised in i) and ii) have formed the basis of most available
studies on allocative inefficiency in Chinese SOEs. Jefferson and Xu (1991)
find a falling coefficient of variation in factor returns within a sample of 352
SOEs between 1980 and 1987 and a positive correlation of the total
compensation package (i.e. including welfare benefits and transfers) with
labour productivity. The estimated correlation coefficient in fact is statistically
the same as the output elasticity of labour estimated on the same data in
Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992). The latter result implies that Chinese
SOEs have begun to behave as profit maximisers (see i)). Jefferson, Rawski
and Zheng (1992) also find the convergence of factor returns between SOEs
and COEs over the 1980s (see ii)). The authors conclude that inspite of the
imperfections in labour markets, the gradual evolution of a capital market




In contrast to these findings, a number of studies reveal substantial allocative
inefficiency in Chinese SOEs at least for the mid-1980s. Thus Xiao (1990),
using census data from 1985, reveals an overinvestment of SOEs in the
production of welfare services ("fringe benefits").
1
3 These services directly
increase workers' incomes and may thus be regarded as an element of wage
drift. Similarly, Kalirajan and Yong (1993) show that SOEs in the steel industry
by the mid-1980s tended to overborrow from the banking system and have
underinvested their retained earnings. This may be interpreted in the sense
that SOEs
1 have preferred to pay out internal funds as bonuses to workers.
Perkins et al. (1993), while admitting to a significant improvement in allocative
efficiency in Xiamen industry over time, find large differences across sectors. In
their study, labour shares in SOEs exceed output elasticities in some industrial
sectors, while for non-state firms labour shares lie far below the production
function estimates.
Probably the strongest attack against the result of allocative efficiency reached
by Jefferson et al. comes from Woo et al. (1994). In their study, the authors
1
2 This is in line with the "structure conduct-performance"-paradigm of enterprise behaviour.
Against this view, the property rights theory suggests that only fundamental institutional
changes regarding the corporate governance of SOEs are likely to induce behavioural
adjustments (for a detailed discussion see Buch et al., 1994).
1
3 In Xiao's model this is induced by the absence of a tax on service incomes. Thus capital
is allocated to fringe benefits until its marginal return equals the return in investment in
production minus the tax rate. In the empirical estimation fringe benefit investment
depresses output per worker directly which suggests a lower level of overall productive
efficiency due to investment divergence.11
present evidence for a dramatic increase in the share of total worker
remunerations in value added in SOEs, while the same measure shows a
moderate decline in a sample of township and village enterprises (TVEs). For
Woo et al. (1994) this is strong evidence for wage drift in SOEs and partly
explains the dramatic decline in their profitability. However, Woo et al. (1994)
do not compare the data on labour shares with their estimations of the output
elasticity of labour. Indeed, the estimated contribution of labour to value added
lies above the labour share in both the SOE and TVE subsamples in their
paper. The issue of whether SOEs in general have experienced wage drift thus
remains unresolved. In the following, new estimation results are presented.
c) Allocative Inefficiency in SOEs: New Evidence from Four Coastal Cities
Our empirical investigation is conducted for 180 enterprises drawn from a
sample of 300 enterprises surveyed in the four coastal cities of Guangzhou,
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Xiamen in 1992 (see Perkins and Zheng, 1994). The
sample consists of six industrial sectors, namely textiles,^garments, electrical
appliances, machine tools, iron and steel and heavy metal products. Five
ownership types are included; SOEs, COEs, TVEs, joint ventures (JVs) and
wholly foreign owned firms (WFOs). Since some of the ownership sub-samples
are fairly small (e.g. only 10 firms in the case of the TVEs) we concentrate on
the distinction ^between SOEs and all others. Following Byrd and Lin (1990),
COEs and TVEs largely operate in a market environment, due mainly to the
fact that their legal owners, the communal or village governments face tough
budgetary restrictions and have tended to impose hard budget constraints on
the firms under their supervision. We thus consider it appropriate to lump
COEs and TVEs together with JVs and WFOs in comparing the behaviour of
firms with soft and hard budget constraints.
1
4 The resulting subsampies, for
which data were available, are 77 SOEs and 103 NSFs. Data were collected
1
4 The group most likely to have softer budget constraints within the NSF sub-sample are
JVs. At least where the majority of assets is held by the state, subsidies may well be
forthcoming to avoid a retreat of the foreign investor. The reasons for including JVs with
other NSFs are partly practical, in that they form the largest group after tfre SOEs and
sample sizes would otherwise be very unequal, and to some extent theoretical, as most
JVs export a large share of their output and are thus subject to international competition













































































































































Source: Own calculations, sample survey data.1
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for the period of 1980 through 1992. However, because responses were
extremely thin in most years except 1980, 1985 and 1990-92 the analysis is
restricted to these five years.
1
5
Table 1 gives some summary statistics for the 180 enterprises in the year
1992. We can see that SOEs typically have about twice the size of NSFs as
measured by the value of gross output. However, the mean value of net output
per worker is rather similar in both subgroups. The average capital intensity is
higher in NSFs, but in view of the very high subsample variation, the difference
is not significant. With respect to profits, both profit margins (profit/gross value
of output) and profit rates (profits/capital stocks) are higher on average in the
non-state sector, though the standard deviations are again very large in both
sub-samples. The average worker remuneration is slightly higher in NSFs but,
as in the case of the capital intensity, the subsample variation is also higher.
Interestingly, while the inclusion of bonuses increases wage differentials
across firms in the non-state sector, in SOEs the inclusion of bonuses leads to .
a much reduced variation coefficient of worker remunerations. Moreover,
bonuses are a much more important component of workers' incomes in SOEs
than in NSFs. However, from Table 1 no conclusions can be drawn as yet on
the sign and significance of the correlation between average compensation
and labour productivity. Overall, the variations within the ownership
subsamples are clearly larger than the differences between them. The main
reason is the overrepresentation of JVs in the NSF subsample. In this respect
our sample is untypical for China as a whole where TVEs and COEs dominate
the "non-state" sector.
In addition to the quantitative variables introduced above, the survey contained
a number of qualitative questions to enterprise managers on their autonomy in
labour relations. As noted above, limited autonomy in SOEs' labour relations
affects the usefulness of comparing allocative efficiency in SOEs and NSFs as
indication of behavioural differences. Table 2 shows the distribution of decision
making authority for six areas in labour relations in both ownership categories.
The remarkable result is that by 1992 between 60 and 80 per cent, of all labour
related decisions in our sample were made either by the firm of by its board of.
directors. Supervisory authorities in conjunction with the firm had still significant
1
5 Ttie size of the sample varies between years. Thus most NSFs came into existence only
after 1985. The first two years thus contain only around half of the observations in later
years.14
Table 2 - Autonomy and the Labour Market: Frequency Distribution in SOEs and







































































































































Source: Own calculations, sample survey data.
influence over the source of employees and the total wage bill in SOEs.
1
6
Workers' councils were also important in deciding total wage levels and in 18
per cent of all SOEs were responsible for decisions concerning the dismissal of
workers. These results suggest that while some SOEs may still have faced
substantial restrictions, overall the operating environment of SOEs and NSFs
did hot differ substantially in the area of labour relations. Thus, were we to find




6 Note that due to the inclusion of COEs and TVEs in the sample of NSFs, this subsample
also reports some degree of influence of supervisory authorities. Even JVs may be
restricted by labour market regulations to some extent.
1
7 This is of course a rather unexpected result in view of our previous discussion. While it is
convenient for our analysis it also limits the degree to which the results can be
generalised. Again, the coastal location of all surveyed enterprises probably introduces15
Table 3 presents the average labour shares in the net value of output (NVO) in
our sample for SOEs and NSFs separately. They are computed as the sum of
worker remunerations divided by NVO for each firm and each of the five years
1980, 85, 90,91, 92. The sum of worker remunerations includes the total wage
bill, the sum of bonus payments and all welfare expenses of the firm. Because
of very poor responses, data on investment in worker accommodation,
allegedly a crucial part of in-kind benefits, could not be included. Another factor
leading to a bias in the computations is the exclusion of all firms with negative
value added, as their inclusion Would have lowered the average labour share
although the true implications are exactly the opposite. Finally, a few extreme
outliers were purged to reduce the variability over time in the average figures.
1
8
Table 3 thus gives only a lower bound estimate of the true labour shares.
Table 3 - Labour Shares (Broad Measure) in Gross and Net Value































































x L/Q, where W is
W
s is average welfare payments per
worker and Q is net value of output.
Source: Survey data collected by author.
an autonomy bias. However, at least the direction of the bias is clear: if we find
behavioural differences between SOEs and NSFs and resulting allocative inefficiency in
the former, in more regulated firms in the interior this is likely to be worse. By contrast if
the SOEs in our sample turn out to be generally efficient, then this might be considered a
beneficial consequence of this high degree of autonomy.
1
8 The proportion of firms excluded because of data problems did not amount to more than
5 per cent of the total. More NSFs were affected than SOEs, probably because of
defective data reporting.16
Table 3 confirms that labour shares in Chinese SOEs have increased since the
start of economic reforms. However, at its peak in 1991 the share of labour in
the net value of output was only 0.577, a figure in line with the average of
around 0.6 for developing economies. Labour shares in NSFs have been fairly
constant around a very similar level of about 0.55. Thus we can observe a
certain degree of convergence in labour shares across ownership, a notable
indication of allocative efficiency in our sample. Table 3 also presents labour
shares at a sectoral level of disaggregation for those four sectors which had at
least five firms in each ownership category. The results show marked cross-
sectoral differences but again, apart from the textiles sector, a certain degree
of convergence of labour shares within sectors. In order to derive clear
conclusions about allocative efficiency in our sample, production function
estimates of output elasticities are needed.
In the computation of output elasticities of labour for our sample, the following
issues had to be addressed. First, we had to check whether the Cobb Douglas
specification summarised the production data in our sample accurately. To this
effect, the Kmenta approximation to a translog function was run and the
significance of the higher order term tested using t-ratio tests (see Hansen,
1994, p. 45). Second, our data was pooled over five years distributed across a
thirteen-year period. Thus structural stability tests on the production function
specification (had to be conducted. Third, any comparison of allocative
efficiency in SOEs and NSFs required the computation of separate output
elasticities for the two subsamples. F-tests for the hypothesis of identical
technologies across ownership could then be used to determine which
estimate of the output elasticity of labour should be used for each sub-sample.
The first issue was easily resolved. We ran the Kmenta approximation for each
of the five years, 1980, 1985,1990, 1991, 1992, and in none of them was the
higher order term significant. Although this result could be due to
multicollinearity between the factor inputs and their cross-product, it is in line
with previous findings (Chen et al., 1988; Perkins et a!., 1993). This supports
our theoretical framework for the measurement of allocative efficiency. The
second issue was less straightforward. The important question for our
purposes was to test for a change in the slopes of the production function, not
for changes in the technological constant over time. Thus year dummies for
technical progress or overall efficiency improvements were included in the
pooled regression. An F-test comparing the residual sums of squares between
the pooled and the single year equations and F-tests on the exclusion of year17
specific slope dummies did not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that
technology was constant over time.
1
9 Third, a Chow test for identical
technologies across ownership was rejected (F-ratio = 7.53 with a significance
level below 1 per cent). Thus our final specification was run by including slope
dummies and a constant dummy for SOEs (standard errors in parentheses):
iii) In NVOjt = -1.23 + 1.02 DSOE + 0.32 In Kit + 0.84 In Ljt- 0.12 DlnKjt - 0.05 D!nLit
(0.20) (0.35) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
t - 0.56 D80 - 0.16 D85 - 0.23 D90 - 0.15 D91
(0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
R
2 = 0.70 DW=1.03.
Equation iii) yields a number of interesting results. First, the output elasticity of
labour is slightly lower in SOEs than in NSFs. At the same time, the output
elasticity of capital is also lower in SOEs, and this difference is statistically
significant.
2
0 In other words, while the SOE sector displays constant returns to
scale, there are strongly increasing returns in the non-state sector (F-ratio of
20.09 with a significance level below 1 per cent). This result is largely due to
the inclusion of COEs among the NSF subsample. COEs are by far the
smallest firms in the sample and operate at a lower level of technical efficiency.
This also explains the surprising positive value of DSOE, although its
significance level is low. One further noteworthy result from equation iii) is the
clear evidence for productivity improvements over the reform period. Average
technological efficiency by 1992 had improved by 56 per cent since 1980, but
this increase was largely achieved before 1985. Average productivity in our
sample fell between 1985 and 1990 and has only recently risen again rapidly.
Moreover, cyclical factors may be driving this result, as 1980 was a crisis year
and 1985 and 1992 were years of high economic growth. When the
regressions were run separately for each ownership category, it further
appeared that efficiency improvements were substantially higher in NSFs than
in SOEs. In the former case, the productivity increase since 1980 was 52 per
1
9 The values were: F (Chow test for structural stability) = 1.918 with a significance levei of
12.5 per cent; F (slope dummies): 1980 = 1.03 (0.36)
significance 1985 =0.39(0.69)
levels for the hypothesis 1990 =0.31(0.73)
of no structural break 1991 = 1,34 (0.26)
in brackets 1992 =0.50(0.60).
2
0 While we do not further investigate this result, it concurs well with the expectation that
SOEs have overinvested in the past and part of their capital stock may be obsolete
(Siebert, 1991).18
cent, while in the latter it reached only 29 per cent.
2
1 Hence the NSFs in our
sample have progressively closed an efficiency gap existing in the early 1980s.
Turning to the comparison of output elasticities with the data on labour shares
in Table 3, the hypothesis that SOEs at large have experienced wage drift in
recent years must be rejected. The estimated output elasticity of labour is
almost 20 percentage points above the share of labour in NVO by the 1990s.
This result is confirmed for the case of the NSFs. The increase in labour
shares in SOEs must thus be interpreted as an improvement in allocative
efficiency, rather than an indication for asset depletion by workers councils as
suggested by Woo et al. (1994). Moreover, as total factor productivity in SOEs
has improved only little, we can hypothesise that technical efficiency has not
significantly improved in the SOEs in our sample. NSFs have achieved some
of their output gains through an outward shift of their production possibilities
and thereby have closed the efficiency gap to the SOE sector. Excluding
COEs, NSFs are overall more efficient than SOEs. This is a reminder to
Chinese policy makers that future growth will have to be generated
increasingly by technical upgrading.
The robustness of the above conclusion of relative allocative efficiency in
Chinese industry was finally tested at the sectoral level. Because the number
of observations was too small in 1980 and 1985 to allow for testing for
structural stability over time, we ran pooled regressions only from 1990 to 1992
for the textiles, garments, electrical appliances and iron and steel sectors.
2? F-
tests again supported the hypothesis of constant technology over these three
years. When comparing the output elasticities of labour estimated in Table 4
with labour shares in Table 3, it emerges very nicely that the only sector in our
sample that has experienced wage drift by SOEs is the textiles industry. This is
also the only sector where we could not find a convergence of factor shares
across ownership. Moreover, the textiles sector shows striking decline in
productivity by 67 per cent since 1985, in contrast to strong TFP growth in
electrical appliances and garments. Note, that in a total of 31 textiles firms, 21
are SOEs. The results of the sectoral production function estimates are not
presented here, as the paucity of the data in earlier years allows no firms
2
1 The higher overall efficiency increase in the pooled sample reflects shifts in the
composition of our sample.
2
2 Due to the small number of observations separate regressions for heavy metal products
and machine tools and for NSFs and SOEs within the other four sectors were not
attempted.19














for structural stability 1990-92
. for constant returns of scale





























































a)Standard errors in brackets. - ^Significance level in parentheses.
Two stars indicate 5 per cent significance. Three stars indicate 1 per cent significance.
Source: Sample Survey data, own calculations.
conclusions. However, they yield qualitative support for the view of increasing
allocative inefficiency in the textiles industry.
2
3 We can thus conclude from the-
empirical investigation in this subsection that the hypothesis of wage drift in
SOEs must be rejected overall, with the qualification that, in recent years,
SOEs in the textiles sector have tended to raise their labour shares above the
output elasticity of labour. While this should lower the profitability of textiles
producers in our sample, the causes of the overall decline in SOE profitability
remain unclarified. This is to what we now turn.
2
3 An interesting side result of these sectoral computations is that TFP growth is the lower
the lower is the output elasticity of labour. This could indicate substantial labour hoarding
in those sectors hit by the direction of structural change.20
IV. Explaining the Decline in Industrial Profitability art China
We start by summarising the data on profitability developments both at the
level of the national economy and for our enterprise sample. Subsequently, the
factors which might have determined profitability developments in Chinese
industry are discussed. Finally, we turn to an empirical investigation of profit
margins in our enterprise sample.
a) The Trend of Declining Profits:
In 1980, average profit margins in SOEs were 25 per cent, in COEs 27 per
cent, and in other enterprises (including mainly TVEs at that time) 38 per cent.
By 1992, average profit margins were 9.7 per cent in SOEs, 10.1 per cent in
COEs and 11.1 per cent in all other enterprises (Zheng, 1994). The share of
SOEs making losses was 9.7 per cent in 1985, but rose to 23.4 per cent in
1992 and 33 per cent in 1993. The corresponding figures for COEs were 11.7
per cent in 1985 and 13.7 per cent in 1992. In 1993, losses by SOEs reached
84.4 billion Yuan, representing 3.2 per cent of GNP. Thus, although the decline
in profit margins has affected the entire industrial sector, the share of loss-
making
 LSOEs is significantly higher and state-sector losses, even exclusive of
implicit subsidies through the banking system and discretionary taxation, are
taking on serious proportions (Perkins and Raiser, 1994).
The overall decline in industrial profitability in China was accompanied by a
significant reduction in the cross-sectoral variation of profit margins. In 1980
the average ratio of gross profits to fixed capital assets was 33.7 per cent with
a standard deviation of 27 points. In 1992 the mean profit rate was 16.8 per
cent and its standard deviation 5 points. This implies a reduction in the
coefficient of variation from 0.80 to 0.30. To the extent that SOEs were
concentrated in the high profit sectors in 1980, entry by NSFs into a previously
protected market may have contributed to the rapid decline in SOE profitability
(Jefferson and Rawski, 1994; Zheng, 1994).
In our sample, the average profit margin in 1980 was 12.1 per cent in SOEs
and 6.5 per cent in NSFs. In 1992 the figures were 2.6 per cent in SOEs and
6.6 per cent in NSFs. In 1980, only two firms in our sample were making
losses, one SOE and one JV. In 1992, the share of SOEs making losses was
18.4 per cent, while it was 22.2 per cent in NSFs. Our data thus display
significant differences to the national totals. Both SOEs and NSFs are less
profitable in our sample than at the national level. One possible explanation
lies in the high degree of local competition in the four coastal cities from which21
Table 5- Profit Margins, Sample Mean and Standard Deviation, 1980, 1992 by





















































































Source: Own calculations based on survey data.
our observations were drawn. Apparently, competition depressed average NSF
profits as early as the start of economic reforms. At the same time, bur sample
mirrors the downward national trend in the profitability of SOEs. Note, finally,
that profit margins vary substantially within the NSF sector, as documented
below. This high variation suggests that in our sample, SOEs do not have
significantly lower profits than NSFs.
Table 5 summarises the sample data on profit margins by ownership and on a
sectoral level both for 1980 and 1992. The small sub-sample sizes limit the
scope for clear-cut comparisons. Nonetheless, we can note a few interesting
details. First, there is no clear indication of a convergence of profit margins
either within or across sectors. Relative price trends do not lead to an
equalisation of profit margins in our sample and firm specific factors seem to
dominate. Second, the one sector in which SOEs by 1992 performed badly in
terms of their profitability is the textiles industry. This is also the sector where
the clearest evidence for wage drift in SOEs emerged from the analysis above.
The contrasting high average profitability in NSFs supports the suggestion that
low profitability in SOEs in the textiles industry may be due chiefly to their
allocative inefficiency.22
b) Determinants: National Factors
Turning to the possible determinants of the overall profitability decline, the
increase of competitive pressures through dynamic market entry by NSFs and
terms of trade losses for the manufacturing sector are the strongest rivals to
the hypothesis of allocative inefficiency. In order to conduct a statistical test of
the effects of competition' on industrial profitability, we regressed average profit
margins in thirty Chinese provinces against the share of NSFs in industrial
output. The labour share was included as an additional variable to test for the
effect of allocative inefficiency in China as a whole. The regression was run for
1989 and 1990. Unfortunately, more recent data were not available. Table 6
reveals that the share of NSFs in industrial output has a significant negative
impact on average industrial profitability in China. Specifically, a one
percentage point increase in the share of NSFs in industrial output decreases
the profit margin by 0.2-0.3 percentage points. As the share of NSFs in
industrial output at the national level increased by around 30 percentage points
since 1978, this would account for a reduction in profitability of 6-9 percentage
points, i.e. around one third to one half of the actual total decline. The share of
labour in the gross value of output also has a significant negative impact, but
its size is much smaller. We conclude that competitive pressures have indeed
eroded profit margins in China.
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a)Standard errors in parentheses.
Two stars indicate 5 per cent significance.









Source: SSB (1992); data provided to the author by the State Statistical Bureau of
China.23
The impact of relative price developments on industrial profitability is less easy
to gauge. As noted above, the variability of sectoral profit margins has been
greatly reduced in line with falling average profits. This could be due to the
erosion of implicit subsidies in the course of price liberalisation.
2
4 In general
the manufacturing sector has suffered a terms of trade loss, as material input
and capital goods prices have increased more rapidly than the industrial output
price deflator. Zheng (1994) presents data that show a 96 per cent increase in
output prices between 1984 and 1992, against an increase of 179 per cent in
material input prices. Accounting for the ensuing change in the composition of
gross industrial output, this yields a value added deflator of 107.4 for 1992
(1984=100). During the same period producer prices increased by 48 per cent.
In other words, subtracting nominal input costs from sales revenue, the real
share remaining for labour payments and profits continuously declined.
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a)Fabricated metal (incl. iron and steel and heavy metal products). -
 0)Electrical power. -





 e)Chemical industry. -
machine tools). - 9)Building materials. -
 n)Lumber processing and
Source: Zheng (1994).
2
4 The other explanation are improvements in the mobility of capital across sectors.
However, while this would reduce profit variability it should rot lead to a decline in profits.24
Combined with the fact that real producer wages in industry have increased at
least as rapidly as labour productivity (e.g. Woo et al., 1994), this necessarily
leads to lower overall profitability. On a sectoral level, however, this
relationship is far from clear cut. Table 7 presents the ratio of material to output
price increases between 1980 and 1992 for 12 industrial sectors and the
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Source: Sample survey data, own calculations.
change in their profit rate (gross profit over net value of fixed assets)
normalised by 1980 profit.
2
5 No clear pattern is detectable with respect to the
change in profit rates and the change in relative prices. Amongst the sectors
most hit by a negative terms of trade shock are sectors with high profitability in
1992, such as garments and machinery. Coal is the least profitable sector
2
5 Profit margins would have been preferable in our context. However, we had to rely on
data provided by Zheng (1994), as the original sources were not available.25
although input prices have not outpaced output prices by much. Clearly, the
level of price distortions at the start of economic reforms and the differentiated
impact of NSF entry and price liberalisation across sectors continue to




c) An Empirical Analysis of Firm-Specific Factors in the Profitability Decline
Apart from the two national trends investigated above, factors specific to each
firm might also explain a good deal of profitability developments in China. Thus
it is to be expected that competitive pressures affect enterprises differently and
that the individual reaction to such pressures determines the firm's profitability.
Similarly, relative price developments might induce different reactions at the
firm level, such as a reduction in input requirements by exploiting substitution
possibilities. Further, although allocative inefficiencies could not be identified
on the basis of average sample figures, individual firms might still pay
excessive worker remunerations and thereby lower profits. The qualitative part
of our enterprise survey included a set of questions to enterprise managers on
the determinants of profitability. The responses are summarised by the rank of
importance in Table 8.
The striking result in Table 8 is the overwhelming predominance of market
conditions in the determination of enterprise profitability, regardless of the
ownership form. Close to one half of all surveyed enterprises reported that a
change in the level of market demand was the most important factor
determining their profitability. In line with the above findings, we may. posit that
market entry of NSFs has reduced SOEs
1 market shares and thereby reduced
profitability. SOEs were aiso affected relatively more by changes in the
structure of market demand than NSFs, a result that is compatible with the
higher degree of planning distortions pre-reform in the former. In third place,
SOEs accord some importance to autonomy in production and price setting,
but clearly this is no longer the decisive factor in our sample. On the production
side, input costs, including labour costs, and access to working capital are the
two crucial factors influencing enterprise profitability. For SOEs, the importance
of working capital is explained by the structure of enterprise finance under
central planning which has left most firms highly undercapitalised (Calvo and
2
6 According to the IMF (1993, p. 29) over half of all industrial losses are accounted for by
sectors still under substantial administrative price control, particularly energy production.
The implication is, of course, that further liberalisation in this area will lead to further
terms of trade losses in all other sectors.26
Coricelli, 1992). Despite of a higher share of self-financing NSFs also seem to
be capital constrained. Interestingly, access to raw materials, mentioned by
Hay et al. (1994) as an important factor in determining profit margins is not
considered of primary importance, although 17 per cent of SOEs and 15 per
cent of NSFs rank it as the third most important factor. Again, the coastal
location probably accounts for this divergence. Finally, NSF managers rank
production factors such as the quality of products, availability of skilled labour,
technology and productive capacity in second place far more often than their
colleagues in SOEs. This is particularly the case for WFOs and JVs which
export a considerable share of output. Thus we find some support for the
contention that Chinese consumer goods markets are not yet up to
international quality standards and that the competitiveness of domestic
producers, particularly SOEs, may be quite low (World Bank, 1994; Perkins
and Raiser, 1994).
Table 8 overall confirms the importance of firm specific factors in determining
enterprise profitability. In what follows we attempt to quantify the impact of firm
specific and national factors on enterprise profit margins in our sample.
Unfortunately, because of weak responses, the sample size in this part was
reduced to around 60 enterprises. In a second step we verify the conclusions
reached in previous studies about the impact of worker incentives and
enterprise autonomy on profitability (e.g. Groves et al., 1994; Hay et al., 1994).
The following variables were included in the basic model of profit margins.
- ALEFF: This variable gives the labour share in each firm minus the
ownership specific output elasticity of labour. It thus measures allocative
inefficiency at the firm level. Unless differences in labour shares are due to




- WKQ: This is the ratio of working capital to the gross value of output at the
end of the year. In line with the results in Table 8 this is expected to have a
positive coefficient.
- QM: This is the ratio of material inputs to gross output in nominal terms.
Thus this variable measures the availability of raw materials and at the
2
7 Of course, with rigidities in wage rates or employment levels an exogenous output shock
will simultaneously reduce profits and raise labour shares. A significant sign for ALEFF
merely implies that in the short run, adjustment costs to demand shocks are typically
shouldered by capital owners. This is probably true for any economic system. Notably,
however, Perkins and Raiser (1994) found that SOEs adjust employment levels more
slowly to a change in output.27
same time proxies for the impact of relative price changes.. As the
questionnaire results reported above accord little importance to raw material
access, we follow Hay et al. (1994) in expecting a negative coefficient on
QM. Hence, larger dependence of the production process on material inputs
increase the vulnerability to a relative price shock.
- DEFVA: This variable is the ratio of material prices over output prices as
shown in Table 7 normalised to zero for the case of no terms of trade
changes. The sign of the coefficient on DEFVA should accordingly be
negative. In our model DEFVA is used interchangeably with QM.
- KL: This is the capital intensity of the firm. This should obviously influence
profit margins positively, if returns on fixed assets are equalised across
firms.
- WF: This gives the total workforce employed by the enterprise and is used
as a proxy for'scale. Under strongly increasing returns, the effect of WF on
profit margins should be positive.
- SPWW: This is the share of productive workers in the total workforce.
Chinese SOEs in particular have a number of service workers on their wage
bill due to their non-productive obligations in the area of worker and
community welfare. As shown by Chen et al. (1988) taking account of these
non-productive workers substantially increases TFP growth in Chinese
industry. By implication we expect profits to be higher in firms where SPWW
is high.
- STOCKS: This variable measures the share of output inventories in the
gross value of output at the end of the year. Here it is used as a proxy for
demand conditions for the individual enterprise. A negative coefficient is
expected, as stock demand should increase the build-up of inventories.
Unfortunately, this variable is not available for the whole sample.
- EXS: This is the share of exports in gross output. The sign of this variable is
not clear a priori. In principle it should be positive, as it reflects
competitiveness and access to additional markets in times of slack
domestic demand. However, due to foreign trade and exchange controls
(Fukasaku and Wall, 1993), exports may well be "mandated and influence
enterprise profitability negatively. These two effects might well cancel out.
Overall, these nine variables proxy the production side factors relatively well.
However, market conditions and management form are clearly
underrepresented, obviously because accurate measurement is far more
difficult. In order to account for this defect, we further included a number of28
dummy variables for the location of the firm, the six industrial sectors and for
ownership type in a separate regression. The locational variables proxy market
structure to some extent, as the share of NSFs in the four cities differs
substantially, both in the sample and at the aggregate level. Thus Shanghai
(DLOC3) has the lowest share of NSFs in both cases. This should ceteris
paribus lead to higher profits. We also included a dummy for location in an
export development zone (DEDZ). Although the same reasoning applies for the
effect of this dummy as for the export share (EXS), in EDZs exporting firms
have access to cheap imported inputs which may boost their profitability. The
industry dummies contain all industry specific factors not measured by the
relative price variable DEFVA. This might include the effects of cross-sectoral
demand shifts, e.g. from capital to consumer goods producers. The evidence
on sectoral profit rates discussed before implies that the industry dummies
should loose significance over time, while DEFVA should become more
significant. On the basis of the summary data in Table 5 we should not expect
a large significance of the SOE dummy. However, dummies for WFOs and
possibly TVEs are expected to have a positive sign.
The regressions were again run for each of the five years 1980, 1985, 1990,
1991, 1992. This time, structural stability of the model was rejected overall
(F=127 with a significance level of 0.0 per cent). Moreover a number of
variables were not significant in any of the five years. First, QM fails to capture
relative price effects and DEFVA was thus substituted for this variable.
Second, the lack of significance of KL indicates the very low return on capital in
China. At least in SOEs, overinvestment is clearly documented. Moreover,
investment divergence to welfare services is included as non-productive assets
in our capital stock data thereby reducing the impact of capital intensity on
profit margins. An adjusted series could not be constructed for lack of data.
Third in the sample overall scale effects are not present. Finally, the export
share remained insignificant probably due to the mentioned ambiguities of
China's trade policy. All four variables were dropped from subsequent
estimations.
All other variables are significant in at least one of the five years. It emerges
very clearly from: Table 9 that ALEFF has a strongly negative impact on
profitability, as expected. Similarly, a decline in the terms of trade, indicated by
a positive value of DEFVA has a significant depressing effect on enterprise
profitability in our sample, although this effect is strong only in 1992. Access to
working capital, on the other hand, influences profit margins positively. While
the signs on ALEFF, DEFVA and WKQ are as expected, SPWW is only29









































F-test for structural stability F = 127 (0.00)
One star indicates 10 per cent significance.
Two stars indicate 5 per cent significance.
Three stars indicate 1 per cent significance.















































Source: As Table 1.
significant in 1985 but its coefficient is unexpectedly negative. STOCKS is
significant from 1990 through 1992, but in 1990 the coefficient is positive, while
in the other two years STOCKS has the expected negative sign.
2
8 Note, that
data,for these two variables in particular were scarce.
2
9 We thus decided to
omit them from the model, both in order to gain additional observations and to
have unambiguous results.
2
8 Possibly inventories from previous years were carried forward in 1990, the trough year of
the recession 1989-1991. Financing of such inventory accumulation through the banking
system has led to the rapid build-up of a bad loan problem in Chinese industry.
2
9 The paucity of the data is particularly annoying in the case of SPWW, as this variable
might have provided a clue to the quantitative importance of welfare services in workers'
incomes (see Jefferson and Xu, 1991).30
Table 10 -Determinants of Profitability in Chinese Industry, 1980-92, Including



























































































a)One star indicates 10 percent significance.
Two stars indicate 5 per cent significance.






























































































Table 10 repeats the same regressions, excluding STOCKS and SPWW and
including industry, location and ownership dummies. We find again that the
coefficient on ALEFF is significantly negative in all years except 1985. WKQ is
signed positively in three years, but is only significant in 1985 and 1992. This
result is interesting, as one would expect that the lack of working capital makes
itself felt most urgently in years of economic recession when retained profits
are low. 1985 and 1992 were boom years, however. It may be that we are
measuring a wrong causality here. Below, we experiment with lagging WKQ
one year in a pooled regression for 1990-1992. DEFVA is only significant in
1992. At the same time, the industry dummies loose significance over time.
Hence our results do confirm that relative price shifts have led to an
equalisation of profit margins across sectors. Nonetheless, as noted above,
entry by new producers into high profit sectors, particularly in the consumer
goods industry, was probably more important. The locational dummies are not
significant, except for EDZ in 1990 which is positive. Market conditions are.
obviously not different enough between the four coastal cities to induce
differences in profitability. Finally, the SOE dummy is not significant as
expected, while WFOs improve their relative profitability over time. WFOs are
the most recent entrants into the Chinese industrial sector, this again confirms
the role of competition in eroding monopoly profits of SOEs in our sample.
Overall, the results in Tables 9 and 10 are not very good. The only variable that
is consistently significant is ALEFF which, as noted, is the case almost by
implication. Particularly in 1985, 1990 and 1991 the model is very likely
misspecified due to the exclusion of variables, such as unmeasurable
differences in the quality of technology or worker effort. Another possible
explanation for the paucity of our results is that the differentiated impact of
government regulations still influences the profitability of enterprises in China,
be they privately or publicly owned. The last task thus was to analyse the effect
of enterprise autonomy and worker incentives on profitability.
To explore the effects of worker incentives and management form on
profitability a pooled model was run from 1990 through 1992. Pooling over time
was necessary in order to have a clear direction of causality, as worker
incentives and the choice of the management form also depend on enterprise
performance in the past. The additional variables included were the share of
bonuses in the total wage bill (STW) and the share of retained profit in total
profit (PROPRE). Because bonuses and retained profits in each period depend
on realised profit in the same period, both variables were instrumented by one
year lags. We also included two management form dummies. DMA1 comprises
all firms on contract responsibility systems, DMA2 is set to unity for all firms32
operating under the director responsibility system. As described in detail by
Hay et aL (1994), the latter system provides for higher incentives for profit
maximisation by enterprise managers. The contract responsibility system is
likely to apply only to SOEs and COEs. All other firms do not generally enter
into fiscal contracts with supervising authorities. We expect DMA1 firms to
have lower than average profitability. DMA2, by contrast, should be positively
signed.
The model was run with these additional parameters and the five variables
included in Table 9. F-tests for structural stability revealed a significant
structural break only for the coefficient on WKQ. When this variable was
excluded structural breaks were rejected (F=1.10 with significance of 36 per
cent). The model was thus run including slope dummies for 1990 and 1991 on
WKQ. As shown in Table 11, bonuses in the previous year have a positive
impact on profit margins, although this is only significant at the 20 per cent
level. Retained profits, have no impact on profitability. This surprising result is
probably due to the little cross-sectoral variation in this variable. Studies using
longer panels have usually found a positive impact of retained profits on profit
margins (e.g. Hong and McMillan, 1994).
In a second run, STOCKS and SPWW were excluded as before. PROPRE was
also dropped as it remained insignificant. Moreover, WKQ was instrumented by
its one year lag to take account of the reverse causality problem mentioned
above. This greatly improves the results as the right column of Table 11
reveals. STW is now highly significant and DMA1 has the expected negative
sign. Ail other variables are also signed correctly. We may thus conclude at
this stage that worker incentives have a positive impact on enterprise
profitability, a result that confirms with a host of previous studies (Chetty, Ratha
and Singh, 1993; Groves et al., 1994; Hay et al., 1994; Hong and McMillan,
1994). Manager autonomy also seems to increase profit margins which should
lend support to the current direction of industrial reform.33
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Source: Sample Survey data, own calculations.34
V. Conclusions
This paper has examined the opposing movements of industrial output growth
and profitability in China. Thereby we have focused on the debate between
those that see falling profits as a sign for increasing allocative inefficiencies in
Chinese SOEs and those that explain falling profits in the industrial sector with
relative price shifts and the erosion of monopoly profits by the entry of NSFs.
The evidence in this paper overall supports the second view. Thus, based on
sample survey data, we could not find evidence for allocative inefficiencies in
Chinese SOEs. While labour shares in the public sector have increased in the
course of the 1980s, by 1992 they were not significantly higher than labour
shares in NSFs and were still substantially below estimated output elasticities
of labour.
An examination of other determinants of industrial profitability puts the
strongest weight on the impact of changing market structure. Here, the entry of
NSFs into previously protected markets has significantly lowered profitability in
SOEs both on a sectoral and provincial level. The impact of relative price
changes, on the other hand is less clear cut. By 1992 the effects of price
controls and administrative interventions on sectoral profitability rates were
probably still substantial. At the level otindividual enterprises we further found
support for the positive effect of worker incentives and management autonomy
on enterprise profits. Firms under the contract responsibility system, requiring
repeated negotiations with supervisory authorities, had lower profits than firms
under direct management responsibility. Clearly, thus, the Chinese industrial
reforms emphasising management accountability have gone in the right
direction and some degree of internal corporate governance has been
established even in SOEs.
Nonetheless, a number of caveats are in order. First, our sample results give
only weak support for an improvement of total factor productivity in SOEs.
Accounting for allocative efficiency improvements, the rate of technical
progress was probably close to zero in the SOEs in our sample. Moreover,
inspite of the concentration of public investment and bank credit on the SOE
sector, COEs and TVEs are rapidly closing the efficiency gap of earlier years.
In this respect, improving the allocation of capital in China and closing those
SOEs with a largely outdated capital stock would seem to merit high reform
priority.
Second, although we did not find allocative inefficiency in the enterprise
sample overall, in some firms labour shares have exceeded output elasticities
of labour. As our micro-economic analysis revealed/this did have a significant35
depressing effect on their profitability. This result in itself is not surprising and
would be corroborated in developed market economies. The danger in China is
that the ensuing losses are shouldered by the central government or the
banking system in the form of explicit or implicit subsidies. In this respect there
is an awkward contradiction between the positive incentive effects of bonus
payments on enterprise profitability and the negative effect of rising labour
shares. However, the latter result is driven more by the failure of loss-makers
to reduce employment sufficiently in response to a demand shock (see also
Perkins and Raiser, 1994) than by excessive bonus payments which are
directly linked to current profits^ The high share of in kind transfers and welfare
benefits in workers' incomes in SOEs, which could not be accurately measured
in this paper, further aggravates the consequences of overemployment. As the
case of the textiles industry shows, adjustment to changing market conditions
is still a highly inertial process in China.
Third, our sample data were collected in four coastal cities that belong to the
most developed regions in China where reforms have gone furthest. SOEs in
the inner provinces, more directly dependent on central government transfers
may well exhibit rather different behavioural patterns. An analysis of soft
budget constraints for SOEs in different regions of China remains a task for
future research. This would allow a more accurate verification of the negative
impact of soft budget constraints on enterprise behaviour. The fact that we
could not identify significant behavioural differences between SOEs and NSFs
in terms of their allocative efficiency suggests, however, that privatisation of
SOEs may not be a necessary precondition for future efficiency improvements.
The general policy conclusion that may be derived from the analysis is that
declining profitability is indeed inevitable to some extent in the course of
transition and not necessarily related to allocative inefficiency. At the same
time, the policy focus should turn to those enterprises that are actually loss-
making. In these firms, particularly in the public sector, the institutional
imperfections in transition economies may ensue in a vicious circle of
progressive decapitalisation through overemployment and through the burden
of welfare payments to employees in the absence of an adequate social
security system. As the share of loss-making SOEs in China's industrial sector
is growing, a solution to this problem may be paramount to preventing
increasing macro-economic instability.36
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